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**Intelligence and Democratization:
The Challenge of Control in New
Democracies**

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INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRATIZATION: THE CHALLENGE OF CONTROL IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

Introduction

To consolidate the new democracies that have emerged worldwide during the last decade and a half is the main political challenge facing political leaders in these countries and world leaders at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Democratic consolidation requires restructuring the economy and bringing the armed forces under democratic civilian control. And, within the latter task probably the most problematic issue in civil – military relations is control of the intelligence apparatus. This is due not only to the legacies of the prior, non-democratic, regimes in which the intelligence or security apparatus was a key element of control, and in which human rights abuses often followed, but also to the inherent tension everywhere between intelligence and democracy. Admiral Stansfield Turner, a former Director of Central Intelligence, highlights this tension: “Secret agencies within democratic governments are anachronisms, because popular controls break down when citizens cannot know everything their government is doing.”¹

¹ Admiral Stansfield Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), p. 3. I use quotes from this book with some frequency for several reasons. Turner was Director of Central Intelligence from 1977 to 1981 and as such, head of the largest intelligence community in the world. The period was characterized by the consolidation of changes in the system due to the exposes after the Watergate scandal and the alleged assassination attempts of foreign leaders resulting in congressional hearings and the imposition of congressional oversight. And Turner an outsider to the community himself working for an outsider president, is most candid about the intelligence agents as professionals and the bureaucratic nature of the

The purpose of this article is to describe the structures and processes involved in the intelligence function, analyze the challenge of democratic control of intelligence organizations with primary attention to new democracies, and highlight in particular the importance of intelligence as a profession in this regard. Any discussion of control and intelligence is difficult, and for several reasons. First, the terms and concepts associated with intelligence are not agreed upon and are ambiguous. Second, much about intelligence is secret; knowledge is power and those who hold it want to keep it secret. The intelligence professionals are a special club even within their own militaries or civilian organizations. They minimize the knowledge outsiders have about them and their activities. Third there is little written about intelligence and democratization. There is some good material on intelligence and democracy, but this pertains to the established democracies such as Great Britain, France, and the United States where the goal is to reiterate the need to control the intelligence apparatus lest it undermine the democracy.²

The Counterintelligence State

In virtually all authoritarian regimes (including the former Soviet bloc) the intelligence apparatus was a key element for maintaining power. These regimes

intelligence community. As a manager of the intelligence community, he conveys the sense of control that is the focus of this paper. It must be noted that he was not popular with large sectors of the community..

were based on something other than democratic legitimacy exercised through free elections. They had to rely on organizations to identify domestic opponents, neutralize their opposition to the government, and seek through a variety of means, including a controlled media, to generate at least domestic apathy. In most cases these organizations were intelligence services. Precisely because of this heavy reliance and its centrality to power, the intelligence apparatus grew in size and power, with the result that they were largely autonomous even within authoritarian regimes.³ In these countries, intelligence meant mainly counterintelligence. That is, protecting the state's secrets from outsiders. And, as almost anything could be defined as a state secret the scope of that which had to be controlled was immense. And, while in most instances the intelligence service linked internal opposition to putative foreign enemies, the overwhelming focus of the intelligence service in most countries was domestic opposition and not other states.⁴

² See the note on sources and author's expertise at the end of this article.

³ For excellent insights into the scope and power of intelligence in a 'typical' authoritarian regime see Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 19-20 where he compares the prerogatives of the Brazilian National Security Service (SNI) to the intelligence organizations in several established democracies.

⁴ In the USSR, and now Russia, scholars have coined the term "counterintelligence state" to capture the sense of its pervasiveness. Waller defines it as follows: "The counterintelligence state is characterized by the presence of a large, elite force acting as the watchdog of a security defined so broadly and arbitrarily that the state must maintain an enormous vigilance and enforcement apparatus far out of proportion to the needs of a real democracy, even one as unstable as that of Russia. This apparatus is not accountable to the public and enjoys immense police powers with few checks against it. The powers are not designed to protect the rights of the individual, despite rhetoric to the contrary, but to protect the privileges of the ruling class and the chekist organs themselves." J. Michael Waller, Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today (Boulder: Westview

Undoubtedly the most negative legacy of the intelligence services in the new democracies was their involvement in human rights abuses. The information they gathered on their own people was at times obtained with abusive methods and used in arbitrary and violent means to eliminate domestic opposition. They are, in short, integrally associated with the human rights abuses which characterize most authoritarian regimes most of the time. While the overall popular legacy is negative, there is little awareness of intelligence functions and organizations. Most civilian politicians, let alone the public at large, do not know enough about intelligence to be able to have an informed opinion about it. In some countries there is real concern that the intelligence apparatus has archived, and is still collecting, information that could be used against average civilians and politicians. Thus not only is there a lack of information, but it is combined with fear, which perpetuates the lack of information.

The Challenge of Democratic Consolidation

Despite efforts by students of comparative politics to develop models of democratic transitions, these transitions are largely *sui generis* and defy generalization. Studies have shown that the authoritarian regimes collapsed due to their successes as well as their failures, or the actions or inaction by domestic elites or foreigners, but in any case power finally passed on to more or less

Press, 1994), p. 13. The original conceptualization was by John J. Dziak, *Chekisty: A History of*

popularly elected civilians.⁵ Transitions are one thing, which mainly allowed new, democratic, regimes to emerge, but they do not necessarily result in stable democratic regimes. Today, in the field of comparative politics, the main focus is on democratic consolidation. Consolidation is a useful concept because it reflects the idea that a new regime's structures and processes are becoming stable. That is, a democratic regime is consolidated when the elites and the masses accept it as "the only game in town."⁶ This acceptance is no easy task, especially if one considers the basic characteristics for a regime to be termed democratic. A standard definition of democracy today is as follows:

Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.⁷

For the accountability to function procedural minimal conditions are necessary. They include the often-noted seven fundamental guarantees ensuring free and fair elections such as freedom of speech, association, running for office, and the like, which constitute a corpus or guarantees requiring a supportive culture or value

the KGB (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1988).

⁵ Thus rather than explanation one of the most highly regarded students of comparative politics comes up with "factors" explaining transitions. See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

⁶ Among other sources on this approach see the following. John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 3-4 and Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 5-6.

system to survive. As more countries begin to consolidate their new democracies, scholars have identified a further defining characteristic, which is the requirement that no unelected body has authority over the popularly elected officials.

A political situation in which these guarantees function is obviously very far from the prior authoritarian regime. Major challenges are found both in the lack of recent experience with democracy and the difficulty of the population valuing these new structures and processes lacking this background. Also, in most cases the countries are confronting economic problems often accompanied by social disruption. Overall, democracy is a very demanding political system for elites and average citizens. Both should be involved for it to function well. New democracies are very tentative. The issue is how to develop the trust and transparency in the context of the legacies of the authoritarian regime. It is possible that the intelligence apparatus is not under government control, but instead has power over the civilian officials. This seems to be the case in Russia today.⁸ If the elected government does not control intelligence it is by definition not a consolidated democracy.

⁷ Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy is...and Is Not," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 40.

⁸ According to Waller the KGB, or its successors, remain very powerful. "Indeed, given the lack of meaningful controls over them, the security organs may be considered Russia's fourth branch of government if not its core." Waller, 1994, p. 296. See also pp. 219-20. This seems to be the general consensus regarding Russia. For example, Knight states "Real, lasting democracy is incompatible with a security apparatus wielding the power and influence that it still holds in Russia." Amy Knight, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 244.

The Meaning of Intelligence

Due to the scope and diversity of intelligence, there is disagreement on its meaning.⁹ Intelligence is mainly defined by process. That is, the process of gathering and using information for some purpose. Since processes are varied, as are the sources of information and their ends, much is of necessity left vague. Most discussions within the intelligence community center on tradecraft; the “how to” of sources and analysis rather than the “what is”? Further the intelligence community either by design or habit is characterized by vagueness and ambiguity. This attitude, or approach, is probably intentional: to not convey information. Once one becomes aware of intelligence, and its limits, there is an even greater awareness that not everything is knowable, let alone known. Further, intelligence officers are trained to collect information and not to provide it except to very few of their superiors with a need to know. This tendency pervades the whole field of intelligence practice. They are professionals in intelligence; information is their vocation. It makes no sense to give it away, unless indeed it is disinformation.

Given our purposes here, and focusing on the new democracies, we must use a broad definition of intelligence in order to convey the scope of what it can

⁹ For a discussion of different meanings see Glenn Hastedt, “Controlling Intelligence: Defining the Problem,” in Glenn Hastedt, ed., Controlling Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1991), pp. 6 – 8.

include, which is extremely broad.¹⁰ Glenn P. Hastedt in *Controlling Intelligence* states succinctly: “The four elements of intelligence are clandestine collection, analysis and estimates, covert action, and counter-intelligence.”¹¹ Loch Johnson elaborates this synthesis:

Intelligence commonly encompasses two broad meanings. First, the secret agencies acquire and interpret information about threats and opportunities that confront the nation, in an imperfect attempt to reduce the gaps and ambiguities that plague open sources of knowledge about the world. A nation especially seeks secret information to help it prevail in times of war, with as few casualties as possible. Second, based on information derived from denied and open sources, policymakers call upon their intelligence agencies to shield the nation against harm (counterintelligence) while advancing its interests through the secret manipulation of foreign events and personalities (covert action). Intelligence thus involves both information and response.¹²

For our purpose, intelligence is understood as these four functions: collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action. Intelligence also refers to the organization collecting the information and the information collected. As all individuals and organizations collect and process information, this information in itself is not the defining characteristic. The key characteristics are that these functions are centered in and intended for the state and they are secret. This knowledge thus has a dual nature; it is information but it is secret information

¹⁰ For example, the CIA in its unclassified “A Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence” describes only sources and analysis. It does not include the more controversial intelligence functions of counterintelligence and covert action which are the focus of books in the memoir and expose categories. This handbook is dated July 1995, was prepared by the Public Affairs Staff, and is coded PAS 95-00010.

¹¹ Hastedt, 1991, p. 6.

¹² Loch K. Johnson, *Secret Agencies: U.S. Intelligence in a Hostile World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 119.

used by the state in potential or real conflicts. What follows is a very brief review of these four functions.¹³

Collection

Intelligence organizations collect information. The questions are what kinds of information do they collect and what means they employ to collect it. At a minimum, they use what today are termed “open sources” which includes periodicals, “the web,” and seminars and conferences. There is an ongoing debate regarding open vs. classified sources since so much information on so many topics is readily available.¹⁴ Another distinction is between human intelligence, or HUMINT, and scientific and technical intelligence to include SIGINT (from intercepts in communications, radar, and telemetry), IMINT (including both overhead and ground imagery), and MASINT (which is technically derived intelligence data other than imagery and SIGINT). HUMINT is information collected directly by people and includes information provided by ambassadors or defense attaches as part of their normal reporting routines, information obtained at public and social events, and information obtained clandestinely through spies, reading others’ mail, and documents. HUMINT is the traditional “espionage,” or

¹³ For more details see CIA, July 1995; Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: American Counterintelligence and Covert Action (Washington: Brassey’s, 1995); Walter Laqueur, The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995); and, Gregory F. Treverton, Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World (New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1987.)

spying, mainly the use of agents in another country to provide secret information to their managers who forward it to their home agencies.

The richer countries have large investments and capabilities in scientific and technical intelligence. In the United States, the bulk of the \$27 billion annual intelligence budget goes to these technical forms of collection.¹⁵ They include the interception and processing of communications by phone, radio, and computers. The processing may well include decoding as well as translation. Another source of scientific and technical intelligence is photo or image reconnaissance. Originally it could be simply an attaché taking picture of ships, planes, or tanks. It evolved with aerial reconnaissance, to include highflying airplanes undetectable or unreachable by a potential enemy. (As in the U-2 flights over Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis). And more recently, it consists of satellite photoreconnaissance or imagery. This technology is becoming much more widely available. Today a country can purchase from private firm's photos that were unavailable or highly classified a few years ago.¹⁶

¹⁴ See for example <http://www.janes.com>; <http://www.stratfor.com>; and <http://www.indigo-net.com/intel.htm> for periodic open source intelligence analysis.

¹⁵ This figure, which is consistent with other published figures, is taken from Martin Petersen, "What We Should Demand From Intelligence," *National Security Studies Quarterly* Vol. V, #2, Spring 1999, p. 111.

¹⁶ See for example <http://www.esri.com> and <http://www.erdas.com> for commercially available geographic imagery.

Analysis

Raw intelligence is not much good without analysis. Analysis, or the anticipation of analysis, also shapes collection requirements. Analysis, what to conclude from raw information, has always been the big challenge in intelligence. In retrospect, the United States should have known about Japanese intentions at Pearl Harbor, the Argentines should have known about American and British reactions to the invasion of the Malvinas, and Saddam Hussein should have known that the United States would react forcefully to the invasion of Kuwait. The problem is not only with the processing of gigantic quantities of data, but even more with policy conclusions from available information.

The intelligence professional must convince policy makers of the accuracy and relevance of the intelligence. Production is only the first step; the intelligence must then be marketed. Analysis, in short, is not a simple technical issue but rather includes methods, perceptions, and political preferences. Much of the analytical literature on intelligence on the US and USSR. focuses precisely on whether, and to what extent, leaders use the information provided to them by the intelligence organizations.¹⁷

¹⁷ See for example Michael I. Handel, ed., Leaders and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1989), Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Collins, 1995.), and Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999). For a short and useful discussion of the issues in production and consumption of intelligence see Mark M. Lowenthal, "Tribal Tongues: Intelligence Consumers, Intelligence Producers," The Washington Quarterly Winter 1992, pp. 157 – 168.

Counterintelligence

At its most basic, the purpose of counterintelligence is to protect the state, and its secrets, against other states or organizations. Seemingly clear and straightforward in these terms, in fact it becomes, in the words of the long-time and controversial head of counterintelligence at the CIA, James Angleton “‘the wilderness of mirrors,’ where defectors are false, lies are truth, truth lies, and the reflections leave you dazzled and confused.”¹⁸ Abram N. Shulsky defines the scope of issues involved:

In its most general terms, counterintelligence refers to information collected and analyzed, and activities undertaken, to protect a nation (including its own intelligence-related activities) against the actions of hostile intelligence services. Under this definition, the scope of counterintelligence is as broad as the scope of intelligence itself, since all manners of hostile intelligence activities must be defended against.¹⁹

Memoir accounts, as well as books by students of intelligence, indicate that counterintelligence has the greatest negative implications for democracy due to surveillance of the citizenry.²⁰ The implications for democracy are much more severe in new democracies where counterintelligence was the principal function of intelligence services. The intelligence service sought to root out real and imaginary enemies of the state, often resulting in yet more opposition leading to a

¹⁸ Peter Wright (with Paul Greengrass), Spy Catcher The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer (New York: Viking, 1987), p. 305.

¹⁹ Abram N. Shulsky (Revised by Gary J. Schmitt), Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence (Washington: Brassey's, 1993), p. 111.

²⁰ Shulsky, 1993, p. 163. For the implications of this surveillance for the citizens in Great Britain see Peter Wright, 1987. Wright was in the leadership of MI5, the British Security Service, for two decades, including the height of the Cold War.

spiral of violence. If even in established democracies a certain amount of paranoia is inherent in counterintelligence – “there is an enemy at work here and we must root him out,” in less institutionalized and non-democratic Third World countries this attitude routinely resulted in extreme violation of human rights and impunity for the intelligence agents.²¹

Covert Actions

Covert actions, or as the British term them “special political actions” and the Soviets “active measures,” are actions intended to influence another state by means that are not identified with the state behind the actions. While covert action is not always included in government documents as part of intelligence, it is the topic most often featured in the books on controversial actions, including intelligence fiascoes. It was the Watergate cover-up and covert actions, the coup in Chile and death of Allende in 1973, and various assassination attempts of

²¹ Gill, 1994, provides an excellent analysis on what he terms “state and security intelligence”. To convey the sense or mood within which the Cold War was fought by U.S. intelligence many use the following quote from the Doolittle Report, presented to President Eisenhower in 1954: “It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy [the USSR] whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the U.S. is to survive, long-standing American concepts of “fair play” must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counter-espionage services. We must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clear, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people will be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.” Quoted in Johnson, 1996, p. 138. Throughout Latin America this same paranoia, which may well have had a real basis in fact, was conveyed in the concept of the “national security state.”

nations' leaders that resulted in the Church and Pike committees in the U.S. Congress in the mid-1970s which asserted greater control over the CIA.

There are three main categories of covert action. The first is propaganda which includes the utilization of the media in another country to convey a certain message. The second is political action which includes funding or other support to government leaders, political parties, unions, religious groups, the armed forces, and the like to follow a certain course of action in another country. The third type of covert action is paramilitary activity, which involves the use of force. It includes smaller actions, like assassination or arming and training a small contingent of dissident tribal groups, or it can be large such as the Bay of Pigs invasion. The problem is that any large action cannot remain covert for long, and even with smaller actions it does not take much imagination to determine the country behind the action. While there is a considerable literature on U.S. and Soviet covert actions, and little on other countries, this does not mean that other countries do not also engage in covert actions. Indeed, countries seek to use their foreign intelligence service, including military attaches, to not only gather information but also to influence policies in another country. Mr. Richard Bissell has elaborated a rationale for covert action:

It becomes overwhelmingly obvious that we are deeply concerned with the internal affairs of other nations and that, insofar as we make any effort to encourage the evolution of the world community in accord with our values, we will be endeavoring purposefully to influence these affairs. The argument then turns out to be not about whether to influence the

internal affairs of others, but about how.... Open diplomacy, however, has its limitations as a policy tool. There are times when a great power can best attain its objectives by acting in total secrecy.... On certain occasions, however, a great power may seek to influence the internal affairs of another nation without its knowledge or without the knowledge of the international community. These circumstances require covert action.²²

This justification is not limited to a great power. Obviously not every country has robust capabilities in all four intelligence functions, but the fact that they exist, that *any nation* has these capabilities, means that this is the global framework within which intelligence must be understood. Intelligence is created to defend the state. It must defend it within the context of potential enemies, and taking into consideration the instruments they have available. All countries have some degree of awareness of the intelligence capabilities of other countries and that they will be involved in, or even the target of, collection and covert action. Since this is the case, they will respond as best they can with collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and maybe covert action of their own.

Intelligence and Democracy

All countries have an intelligence apparatus of some scope and capability. The question for new democracies is: what kinds of intelligence do they need and how can it be controlled? While the challenge is especially severe in the new democracies, democratic control of intelligence is a challenge everywhere for at

²² Richard M. Bissell, Jr. (with Jonathan E. Lewis and Frances T. Pudlo), Reflections of a Cold

least four reasons. First, as Pat Holt states “Secrecy is the enemy of democracy.”²³ Why? Because secrecy encourages abuse. If there is secrecy how can there be accountability, the operative mechanism of democracy? Because intelligence organizations are secret they themselves can avoid the checks and balances on which democracy is based. Second, intelligence agencies are not only secret but these organizations also collect and analyze information, and information means power. Intelligence organizations take on agendas and purposes of their own. Secrecy limits public scrutiny. Peter Gill uses the model of the “Gore-Tex” state to illustrate the degree of penetration by the security intelligence services. Information flows in one direction and not two directions; to the intelligence services and not from them to state and society.²⁴ Intelligence may be autonomous from state control and, through the use of information that others do not have, influence or even determine policy. There are two further perceptual or behavioral elements, beyond secrecy and the unique control of information, that hinder democratic control of intelligence organizations. Third, intelligence agents and organizations routinely break laws abroad. Indeed, in most cases they do not admit to who they are or for whom they work. Further, spying is illegal everywhere. Intelligence managers provide undeclared funds to foreign nationals as agents and authors of articles, tap phones, steal documents,

Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 207-7.

²³ Pat M. Holt, Secret Intelligence and Public Policy: A Dilemma of Democracy (Washington: CQ Press, 1995), p. 3.

and the like, all of which are illegal. There may be a problem in making the distinction between breaking laws abroad and not breaking them at home. Fourth is the self-justification that intelligence is critical to defense of the nation. In the words of Peter Wright, “It [intelligence] is a constant war, and you face a constantly shifting target.”²⁵ It is up to the intelligence organizations to root out spies, domestic and foreign, who are threats to the nation. They may easily perceive that they, more than anyone else, really know what is going on; how dangerous the threat really is. Intelligence officers’ task is to identify threats to the nation, and there are always threats; the only question is, how serious are the threats. They know things, and others do not, and this may lead to a certain condescending attitude regarding others who are not in the know, who are not initiated into the club.²⁶

In view of the difficulty everywhere to control intelligence, and considering the background in most new democracies, what are the choices to be made and their implications for democratic control? Initially, and this is really a requirement that is the same regarding the armed forces in general, democracies must establish a clear and comprehensive legal framework. Intelligence is “slippery,” and if the legal framework is not clear and explicit intelligence agencies can never be brought under control. The legal framework must emerge

²⁴ Gill 1993, pp. 79 – 82.

²⁵ Peter Wright, 1987, p.169.

²⁶Admiral Stansfield Tuner, 1985, calls attention to this characteristic with CIA analysts on p. 116.

from the democratic structures and processes, and must seek to ensure in the area of intelligence the continuation of the democratic values that they seek to promote.

There are three general decisions to be made regarding intelligence, which should be stipulated, in this clear and explicit legal framework. The first choice is to determine which of the four intelligence functions will be implemented and how much of the country's resources will be allocated to them. The former part of the question can be answered only by assessing the global and regional situation, alliances, recent history, and available resources. The latter part of the question is a political decision. How much is intelligence worth? Obviously it is worth a great deal if it provides the nation with the means to maintain its independence in the face of a hostile neighbor. Intelligence also can be valuable in lieu of larger forces. It can allow a country to focus its forces on the most serious threats thereby minimizing redundancy and higher operational costs. But to assess what it is really worth requires a political decision. Does the mere fact of having a certain level of intelligence capability avoid hostile intentions and actions? It also depends on its relationship with other, more powerful, countries that may share intelligence capabilities with it. Neither of these decisions can be made in a vacuum, and they should be integrated into an overall framework for decision - making in defense. The main point is, however, that there must be an

analysis of what the nation requires and how much it is willing to pay for it. This is, of course, a general issue in civil – military relations.

The second choice concerns the balance in intelligence between civilian and military organizations, both in terms of production (collection and analysis) and consumption. In most countries, intelligence has been a military monopoly in production and consumption. During democratic consolidation there are decisions to be made as to whether military intelligence should be replaced in whole or in part by new civilian organizations. Should the military have responsibilities only in military intelligence and civilians assume responsibility in strategic intelligence and counterintelligence? Equally important as collection is consumption. To whom is the intelligence product distributed? Only the president of the country, his director for intelligence, members of the cabinet such as Interior, only the military, the congress, who else? Obviously access to the information, and the form in which it is made available, has great implications for the potential power of those who receive it.

A sub-theme of this balance between civilian and military institutions is the issue of internal and external intelligence. Does the same organization have responsibility for domestic intelligence as well as foreign intelligence? The former is of course mainly counterintelligence. Are these functions fused? If so, what are the controls so that it is not used for personal political purposes? In most democracies the functions are separate. In the United States, the Federal Bureau

of Investigation handles counterintelligence within the United States, and the Central Intelligence Agency has performed both functions outside the country. In most European democracies the functions are divided between counterintelligence and foreign intelligence, the organizations doing their tasks wherever necessary, at home or abroad.

The third choice concerns the relationship between intelligence and policy. This also logically involves the issue of coordination among the intelligence organizations. Is all intelligence formally coordinated by a director of central intelligence as in the United States, but separate from policy (the DCI is not in the cabinet)? Or, is it separate as with MI 5 and MI 6 in Great Britain but located within the Foreign Office thus linking it with policy? The main issue here concerns an ongoing debate about the implications for objective intelligence analysis when it is closely linked to policy vs. the supposed loss of efficiency by having intelligence that is not linked. There are great variations in how different democracies handle this issue.²⁷ The answer depends on the political traditions and structures of the country, but the underlying issue of policy-relevant but not policy-driven intelligence is what must be assessed. A critique of covert action in the United States is that these actions fuse all within the CIA. Rather than providing intelligence objectively, the agency also develops the policy, conducts

²⁷ The main options are nicely summarized in Johnson, 1996, pp.129 – 31. It should be noted that the Director of Central Intelligence may not in fact be able to coordinate all intelligence since he does not control the budgets for the larger and more expensive collection and analysis assets.

it, and largely evaluates its success. Hastedt, who has published one of the few books on controlling intelligence, makes his position explicit on this issue: “The purpose of intelligence is to inform and warn policy-makers. The choice of what to do lies with the policy-maker. If intelligence is brought into too close a contact with policy making it runs the risk of being corrupted.”²⁸

All three of these decisions hold implications for democratic control over intelligence. The first choice, about intelligence functions, has obvious implications especially regarding counterintelligence. The second, civilian vs. military location of the intelligence function has implications in terms of civilian control over the armed forces and then civilian control over intelligence. Third, a very close link with policy can make intelligence less a function of information gathering and analysis, and more a tool used by political leaders to retain power.

Explicit Mechanisms of Control over Intelligence

A common mechanism to control intelligence is through its separation into different agencies. Policymakers should prevent any single agency from having a monopoly on intelligence. This is the model in the United States. A possible arrangement could be separate intelligence organizations for each of the armed forces and the police and separate organizations for domestic and foreign intelligence. This proliferation of organizations may or may not be efficient,

²⁸Hastedt, 1991, p. 10. For the comments on covert action see Admiral Stansfield Turner, 1985, p.

since the different agencies battle among themselves, but it eliminates the chances of monopoly by any single organization or individual and creates opportunities for more democratic control.

A second mechanism for democratic control is an oversight mechanism or mechanisms. Does anyone have oversight over intelligence or does the apparatus, and it alone, have responsibility for monitoring its own performance? The latter option is extremely dangerous. In the United States oversight has expanded to the current situation where not only do the intelligence agencies have inspector generals, but also the executive has oversight bodies and the two houses of congress also have oversight committees.²⁹ In Great Britain, oversight remains very limited but the democratic institutions are hallowed. It seems necessary today in countries that are seeking to consolidate their democracies that if intelligence is to be under democratic civilian control then there must be oversight. How far it extends, and under what terms it operates, will vary tremendously. Oversight has immediate implications for control but also has implications for popular support for intelligence.

Since knowledge equals power, it is important to specify who has access to the intelligence and in what form. Is it limited only to the military or do civilians in the executive also have access? What about the legislature? Do any

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or all of them have access even before operations such as covert actions? This issue concerns not just immediate distribution of intelligence (which here extends to covert actions as well) but the general availability of information after a certain period of time. The possibility of wider distribution also holds implications for control. If the agencies know that in the future the files will be open for public scrutiny, they must be careful of their behavior.

There is a dilemma inherent in the issue of control and that is the trade-off between democratic control over intelligence and the effectiveness of the intelligence apparatus doing its critically important work to defend the nation. This dilemma can be reduced to the tension between accountability, which requires transparency, and intelligence, which requires secrecy. For example, does legislative oversight result in agents being uncovered? Democracies wrestle with this dilemma constantly and there is no easy or sure solution. Rather, it requires constant attention and adjustment.

The possibility exists that democratically elected civilians may not in fact be interested in controlling the intelligence apparatus in the new democracies. In virtually all of these countries, the use of elections to determine access to power is a new and relatively fragile means of determining who has power. Even in old and stable democracies leaders often prefer “plausible deniability” rather than

²⁹ For very positive comments see Admiral Stansfield Turner, 1985, especially page 132 and 269 – 271. For the background and details see L. Britt Snider, Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress as a User of Intelligence, (CIA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, February 1997.)

access to the information required to control a potentially controversial or dangerous organization or operation.³⁰ Logically this would be even more the case in newer democracies. First, the politicians may be afraid of antagonizing the intelligence apparatus through efforts to control it because the intelligence organization might have something embarrassing on them. Second, they may be afraid because the intelligence organization in the past engaged in arbitrary and violent actions and the politicians are not sure that a corner has been turned. Third, there are probably no votes to be won in attempting to control an organization that most people want to ignore.

We have found that the issue of democratic control of intelligence can be profitably discussed only in those polities that have already sorted out the larger issues of civilian control of the military and have begun to institutionalize the structures and processes for this control. In the others the environment remains too tense for open discussion of intelligence organizations and oversight. Intelligence is nowhere the first issue the new civilian leadership wants to confront.

Towards Democratic Control of Intelligence

For those countries that want to begin to exert democratic civilian control over the intelligence apparatus there are several tasks that must be undertaken.

³⁰ The most famous recent instance of this was the “Iran-Contra” scandal during the Reagan

These tasks are similar to those of asserting civilian control over the military in general, but are more acute due to secrecy and the penetration of state and society in line with the counterintelligence function.³¹ The tasks that follow are not prioritized, and should be pursued simultaneously. They concern civilian competence, public interest and then pressure, and the profession of intelligence. The first task is to motivate civilians to learn about intelligence so they can control it. In most authoritarian regimes intelligence was monopolized by the military and civilians had no role whatsoever. These countries will be unable to control intelligence unless they prepare civilians to learn enough both to understand what intelligence is all about and to achieve some degree of cooperation, if not respect, from the intelligence professionals. None of this will be easy, but one has to start somewhere. It should begin with the formal and public commitment by the government to reviewing intelligence to establish a new policy. The commitment must also open the possibility for civilian positions in intelligence. Otherwise, as in civil–military relations in general, no civilians will come forward if they do not anticipate viable careers. Then, civilians can begin to learn about intelligence by reading the unclassified literature from several countries, and taking advantage of cooperative training arrangements in

administration. See for example, Andrew, 1995, pp. 478-93.

³¹ It should be noted that the similarity between intelligence and civil - military relations has been touched upon in Uri Bar-Joseph, Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States The United States, Israel, and Britain (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). However, Bar-Joseph deals only with established democracies and thus has a fairly

intelligence with other nations. It also makes sense to establish regional programs for them to share their insights and further develop their common fund of knowledge, with regional intelligence sharing programs an obvious result.

The second task is broader and it is to encourage a political culture, which supports the legitimate role of intelligence in a democracy but does not allow it to run rampant. James A. Schlesinger made this point: “to preserve secrecy, especially in a democracy, security must be part of an accepted pattern of behavior outside of government and inside.”³² The responsibility must go in both directions; from democratically elected civilians to control intelligence but from them as well to not release classified information for personal or political reason. How can this culture be encouraged? As in the general case of democratic civil–military relations, by generating a public debate. The challenge is to break through the current apathy or fear of the population regarding intelligence by initiating the debate. In some older democracies, including Canada, France, Great Britain, and the United States there is a fairly regular debate stimulated by non–governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media, which is periodically dramatized by intelligence fiascoes that become public. The role of the media is crucial, and their awareness of intelligence can be encouraged in the same manner

restricted view of the problems of civil - military relations, and does not deal with the problems inherent in controlling intelligence in new democracies.

³² Quoted in Adda Bozeman, “Political Intelligence in Non-Western Societies: Suggestions for Comparative Research,” in Roy Godson, ed., Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., the USSR, the U.K. & the Third World (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), p. 133.

as the public. Again, the debate can be stimulated by the politicians' commitment to establish a policy on intelligence. Such a debate has been initiated in a few newer democracies including Guatemala. The Peace Accords between the government and the guerrillas signed in December 1996 stipulate, in several sections that intelligence will be transformed and put under civilian oversight. These commitments have led to public seminars on intelligence, publications by NGOs, and articles in the newspapers.³³ In Argentina there also is a debate initiated by a small number of civilians realizing that democratic consolidation requires civilian control over intelligence.³⁴

The third task is not about civilians or the public in general, but concerns the selection, training, and overall preparation of intelligence professionals; those who specialize as intelligence agents working for the state. The focus on intelligence as a profession is particularly apt since these professionals, more than any other single profession, are controlled even in a democracy by professional norms more than outside controls (such as oversight).³⁵ In contrast, in addition to their self-policing, or ethic, doctors are regulated by the legal system and licensing boards, lawyers by the legal system and bar associations, politicians by

³³ For one example of a major contribution to the debate see Fundacion Myrna Mack, "Hacia un Paradigma Democratico del Sistema de Inteligencia en Guatemala" Guatemala, Octubre de 1997.

³⁴ An example here is Eduardo E. Estevez, "La Reformulación de la Inteligencia Estratégica: Bases para su Comprensión" Departamento de Posgrado, Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Septiembre de 1997.

³⁵ Hastedt's argument is that formal – legalistic controls have limited value in controlling intelligence and informal norms and values are extremely important. I agree, but he only studies

the legal system and elections, and the armed forces by budgets, promotions, and a myriad of civilian control mechanisms. The intelligence professionals, however, are controlled only in the last analysis, if that, by the external structures and processes noted above. They are granted impunity to break laws abroad and have tremendous leeway within their own country and organization. As illustrated in virtually all the books and articles dealing with intelligence agents, secrecy allows them to operate with a tremendous amount of autonomy. There are few checks because they operate secretly, they are ensconced in a bureaucracy with other like-minded agents and develop a closed-club mentality, and they are very suspicious of outsiders, including at times their superiors.

Intelligence as a Profession

A profession can be defined in terms of the three criteria of expertise, corporateness, and responsibility.³⁶ In the case of the intelligence professional the criteria are as follows:

the U.S. and at that only the Directors of Central Intelligence. See Glenn Hastedt, "Controlling Intelligence: The Values of Intelligence Professionals," in Hastedt, 1991, pp. 97-112.

³⁶ While the sociological literature on professions is huge, that which is most pertinent here is the literature on the military as a profession. The classic is Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). The most useful additions and critiques include the following: Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972); Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil – Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," Armed Forces & Society Winter 1996, pp. 149- 177; and, Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962).

First, their expertise is defined in accord with the four intelligence functions of collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action described above. The range of what intelligence professionals do is extremely diverse. What unifies them, or defines them as intelligence professionals, is secrecy. Unlike other professions, but for certain limited aspects of patient or client privacy or privilege, the intelligence professional is defined by secrecy. (The military profession also has elements of secrecy but mainly these pertain to intelligence.) In reference to covert actions one of the foremost American intelligence professionals, Richard M. Bissell Jr. states:

The professional competence of a clandestine service consists of, and is measured by, its ability to carry out operations secretly (or deniably), much as lawyers' competence consists in their ability to win cases, and doctors' in their ability to prevent or treat illness. The clandestine service may number among its members brilliant journalists, able warriors, and superior political analysts, but the professional skill for which, presumably, they are hired is the ability to organize and conduct operations covertly. This is a rather specialized skill not widely found outside of intelligence and internal security services.³⁷

And, in reference to counterintelligence one of the foremost British intelligence professionals states:

The profession of intelligence is a solitary one. There is camaraderie, of course, but in the end you are alone with your secrets. You live and work at a feverish pitch of excitement, dependent always on the help of your colleagues. But you always move on, whether to a new branch or department, or to a new operation. And when you move on, you inherit new secrets which subtly divorce you from those you have worked with

³⁷ Bissell, 1996, p. 216.

before. Contacts, especially with the outside world, are casual, since the largest part of yourself cannot be shared.³⁸

Their expertise is thus diverse, as is intelligence itself, and the defining characteristic of the profession is secrecy.

Second, their corporateness is defined by their access to secret systems, documents, information, and operations. As doctors enter the profession through boards and internships & residencies, and lawyers by the bar exams, intelligence professionals enter via security clearances. Clearances are the control mechanism for entry into and continuing in the profession. There are few educational requirements in common for intelligence professionals, and there is little else that defines their corporate identity but for their access to classified information.³⁹ In intelligence everything is compartmented; different levels of clearances plus the need to know determine access. Even agents with similarly high clearances do not, are not supposed to, discuss information unless they have the need to know in terms of their current projects and responsibilities. The security clearances, the working together in secret and on secret information and projects, create identification as a member of a unique club. It may also breed certain arrogance, or sense of impunity, since if nobody else knows then how can those that don't know control those that do?

³⁸ Wright, 1987, p. 67.

³⁹ Bar-Joseph, 1995, p. 49 notes the absence of formal educational requirements. The absence of educational elements leads him in large part to not consider intelligence as a profession with which I do not agree.

Third, the responsibility of the intelligence professional is to serve in defense of the state. But if we consider the first two criteria of expertise in secret matters and access via security clearances, we are led inexorably to a profession, which largely governs itself according to its own definition of responsibility. In new democracies this is doubly serious, as the state was not accountable to the general population and the intelligence agents may not have even been responsible to the small group in control of the state. Who can know and who is to control? The sense of responsibility is incredibly important, and even in stable democracies enough incidents come to light to cause concern that the agents are not serving the state. Or, better, they are serving it in their limited organizational terms and not those of the democratically elected leaders. This sense is captured in a quote from James Angleton when testifying before Congress on why the CIA had not destroyed stocks of a toxic poison: “It is inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all the overt orders of the government.”⁴⁰ It is difficult to accommodate this kind of attitude with the principles and procedures of democracy.

To Change a Profession

This review of the defining characteristics of the intelligence profession suggest that major efforts must be made in the new democracies to promote and

⁴⁰ Quote in Admiral Stansfield Turner, 1985, p. 178.

inculcate a sense of professional responsibility by making the agents and agencies responsible to the state via the democratically elected leaders. How to do this? Only by committing great attention and resources to recruitment, training, and obligating that the professionals remain involved in the larger polity and society. The specifics of this prescription have to be defined separately for each nation. One of the biggest difficulties is that the government will most easily recruit retired military into civilian intelligence positions. They may have taken off the uniform, but their attitudes remain the same as those of everyone around them. If new personnel cannot be found, then can their ethic of responsibility be changed? In most countries, including the older democracies, there is little explicit attention to promoting this ethic.⁴¹ In the older democracies the larger society supports responsibility to the democratic state and the institutions are not under question so there is less need to promote the ethic. In the newer democracies there is clearly a need to promote it as well as promoting an open debate on intelligence and interesting civilians in the field.⁴²

⁴¹ This is precisely what Hastedt advocates. "Only by seeking to structure how intelligence professionals see their job can one hope to prevent abuses from occurring in the first place or ensure reponsiveness." See Hastedt, 1991, p. 14.

⁴² The other side of the recruitment is retirement of intelligence professionals. It is important for governments to ensure that their intelligence organizations create stable career progression based on merit, including provisions for decent retirement after service. This ensures loyalty and gives them options to not stay on in intelligence functions. Or even worse, turn to illegal activities since their skills are not easily transferable to other occupations.

Conclusion

All nations engage in intelligence activities at one scale or another. They must as other countries do, and no nation can afford to not know what is going on outside and inside their country, and if necessary counter other countries' efforts to influence developments in that country. In most of the world intelligence services of authoritarian regimes were central to the survival of those regimes and in the most negative manner imaginable. Today, in the midst of challenges to democratic consolidation, seeking to ensure democratic control over intelligence is both necessary and extremely difficult. In many countries there is virtually no public recognition of this fact. Without decisive action, however, the intelligence apparatus will remain a state within a state and prevent democratic consolidation. Like all else in civil–military relations, the challenges are many and it requires continual efforts on the part of civilians and officers to achieve the most appropriate balance of efficiency and transparency for the country.

A Note on Sources and Expertise

The literature on intelligence is routinely broken down into four categories: memoirs of retired intelligence professionals; exposes by disgruntled former professionals, journalists, and activists; government reports, studies, and documents; and academic studies. Of these four categories only the last is largely objective. The other three are motivated by personal, partisan, or national goals,

and thus contains some kind of bias or “agenda.” Further, the literature in any one category is not so abundant that the interested student can dispense with material in any one of these categories. This is not the place to assess the literature in general, but to highlight that there is much material on the United States and now Russia, less on European democracies and South Africa, and very little on the new democracies in book or journal articles. Now, with the Internet there are available sources of information on aspects of intelligence throughout the world. There is not, however, to the best of my knowledge, any literature to provide the background and discussion of issues in which to locate this current Internet information on the new democracies. In sum, the material is sketchy and an overall conceptual framework is yet to be written.

To write this article I drew on the available literature less for inspiration and analysis, and more for examples of the points I wanted to make. My background and current activities are what provided the framework. I attended graduate school in Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley during the 1960s. After completing my studies in 1969 I taught at McGill University, Montreal until 1987. During that time I researched on “hot” topics; first on politics and religion in Brazil (during the authoritarian regime) and later on the Portuguese Revolution and its path to democratic consolidation. During that period of two decades I had occasion to meet intelligence agents abroad who would ask me lots of questions but never told me anything. Lacking reciprocity I

avoided contact with them. In 1987 I joined the Naval Postgraduate School and in 1989 became chairman of the Department of National Security Affairs. In that position I qualified to receive a high security clearance because I had to attend meetings and read documents requiring it. Having the clearance allowed me to learn quite a lot about the United States intelligence community with seminars and meetings at the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Office of Naval Intelligence, Office of the Joints Chiefs of Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon, regional headquarters of the armed forces, and American embassies abroad. Because our department offers one of the two masters degree programs in intelligence (the other is the Joint Military Intelligence College), we have alumnae in intelligence positions throughout the community. Through these contacts, and involvement with our courses, faculty, and students, I became interested in intelligence as a field of study. I could then appreciate the “one-way street” of information in my earlier experience since I had not been “cleared” at that time. Unfortunately for the field of study, as noted in the text of this article, most of intelligence is “slippery” in that there is much information on systems, tradecraft, and wiring diagrams, but little analysis of intelligence as organization and system. The effort is put into analysis of the information and not the organization.

When the Center for Civil–Military Relations was founded in 1994 I became involved as director of the programs in Latin America. It was clear to

me, with my background in Brazil and Portugal, that intelligence is a core topic in civil–military relations. Consequently we include a block of study on it in most of our programs in the region. We also developed a full week program on the topic of intelligence and democracy held in Buenos Aires in August 1998. The experience throughout Latin America, and especially Argentina, brought me into contact with officers who are intelligence professionals and a small number of civilians who are interested in intelligence. Hopefully the democratic consolidation of that continent and others will continue apace, and the elected civilian leadership in all of the countries will feel secure enough to assert control over intelligence

Intelligence And Policy-Making

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Documents, Theses and Technical Reports

Banks, Chuck. "Covert Action: An Instrument of Foreign Policy." Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1994. 19p.

Abstract: *The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief introduction to covert action for those on the periphery of, or interested in, this aspect of intelligence activity. The objective is to examine, using open source information, the nature of covert action, the purposes it serves, why it must be kept secret, whether it is legal and ethical, and what makes it work. This paper is by no means exhaustive. Covert action has many definitions, but a useful one is 'the attempt by a government to influence events in another state or territory without revealing its involvement. Title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 defines covert action as: 'an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.' There is a subtle but distinct difference between covert and clandestine, in that clandestine operations seek to obscure the activity itself, while in covert operations it is more important to hide the sponsoring role of the United States. Covert action can be thought of as a continuum, between relatively benign propaganda operations and paramilitary activity. Political action lies in between.*

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A280 541

Berkoff, Russ H. "Artificial Intelligence and Foreign Policy Decision-Making." Master's thesis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1997. 180p.

Abstract: *With the advent of a global information society, the US will seek to tap the potential of advanced computing capability to enhance its ability to conduct foreign policy decision making. This thesis explores the potential for improving individual and organizational decision making capabilities by means of artificial intelligence (AI). The use of AI will allow us to take advantage of the plethora of information available to obtain an edge over potential adversaries. Another purpose of this thesis is to give guidance to the software community as to what policymakers will need in order to improve future decision making processes. The third purpose is to encourage government and private sector decision makers to allocate adequate resources to actualize the potential of AI. The method of analysis this thesis uses is to examine US foreign policy decision making on the cognitive or individual, group, and organizational levels. Using the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Yom Kippur War as test beds for critical analysis, identification of both decision enhancing and impeding functions is accomplished. Finally, a counterfactual analytic framework, using an AI model, tests the likely influence of AI on decision making. The results substantiate the value of AI as both a decision making enhancer and an impediment reducer for the policymaker. Additional conclusions are derived that improve the decision making system and its processes by means of introducing an AI capability.*

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A340 985

Brookes, Michael, A. "Perils of a Democratic Peace." Master's thesis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 1997. 211p.

Abstract: *President Clinton has declared that the promotion of democracy is the key to ensuring America's security in the post-Cold War world. This assertion is based upon an international relations theory called the "democratic peace." Expressed simply, it states that democracies are reluctant to engage one another in war; therefore, increasing the number of democracies worldwide will promote peace and, ultimately, America's security. Although it is a seductive theory, the notion of the democratic peace has many pitfalls. The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that the democratic peace theory is not an appropriate foundation for U.S. national*

security strategy. First, I establish that "democracy" is not universally desirable. Instead, cultural factors, ethnic nationalism, and economics create imperatives that thwart efforts to develop democracy. Second, I cite the actions of the intelligence services of democratic states against fellow democracies - including espionage, economic espionage, and covert action - to illustrate that peace is not without peril. Ultimately, pursuit of a democratic peace may jeopardize national security because it threatens to entangle the United States in costly foreign interventions. Additionally, the false sense of security it engenders may lull the U.S. into a state of complacency from which it will be unable to recover.

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A341 470

Campbell, Julian M., Jr. "Military Intelligence: Its Role in Counterinsurgency, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 20 April 1988. 47p.

Abstract: *This monograph examines current US Army IEW operational concepts for counterinsurgency, doctrinal literature, current practices in Latin America, lessons learned from Southeast Asia and British Army experiences. This doctrinal and historical base together with its theoretical underpinnings is analyzed and evaluated in light of the military intelligence experiences of the French Army in its counterinsurgency roles from Indochina to Chad, 1946-1984; the Uruguayan suppression of the Tupamaros, 1963 - 1973; and the Portuguese Army campaign in Mozambique, 1964 - 1974. The study concludes that case studies of the French, Uruguayans and Portuguese offer no new IEW principles to the US Army. The enhancements that the study of these armed forces drive home to US IEW doctrine and operations are the dire necessity for governmental legitimacy to include the humane treatment of people, the necessity for improved police-military relations in LIC and the primacy of HUMINT among the intelligence disciplines in counterinsurgency. In a larger sense, the study of the French, Uruguayans and Portuguese confirms that political ends must be translated into military means to achieve operational success in a counterinsurgency. Additionally, their study confirms the notion that an art of war approach to counterinsurgency is valid and substantiates the premise that security stands as the center of gravity for an insurgent force.*

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A195 567

Cesar, Edison et al. "A New Approach for Measuring the Operational Value of Intelligence for Military Operations." Final report. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1994. 175p.

Abstract: *This report will be of particular interest to those who are involved in policy analysis for the Army's five-year program; in developing and applying methodology and models to assess military value, particularly the value of intelligence; and in comparing the potential contributions of Intelligence and Electronic Warfare/Target Acquisition (IEW/TA) systems, employment doctrine, and technologies in various military operations scenarios. The purpose of this project was to develop a methodology and one or more prototype models for studying IEW/TA in an operational context; more specifically, the methodology enables the operational value of intelligence assets and activities to be expressed in quantifiable terms useful to resource acquisition decisionmakers, military planners, and operational managers. The two prototype models were designed as aids for performing policy and other analysis of key issues. The term prototype refers to a model that has been developed to the point that its usefulness has been demonstrated. The models can be used to help look for gaps and redundancies in current and proposed capabilities, help justify resource allocations, and seek desired mixes and employment strategies of IEW/TA assets and their communications network architectures to support operations. They were also used as tools for developing the methodology.*

REPORT NUMBER: RAND/MR-227-A

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A282 802

Cranford, Allen D. "An Examination of Nation Assistance: Should the U.S. Support Third World Efforts to Combat Internal Lawlessness, Subversion, and Insurgency?" Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 27 January 1997. 50p.

Abstract: *This paper examines the relevancy of the current National Military Strategy's (NMS) strategic concept of Peacetime Engagement and its component of Nation Assistance in a post Cold War, Third World environment. This strategy promotes the need to assist friendly nations in upholding democratic ideas by supporting their efforts to combat internal lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency. The strategy also endorses conducting civil military operations, engaging in bilateral and multilateral exercises, sharing intelligence and communications, and providing logistics support. This latter use of Nation Assistance appears to be both legitimate and helpful to Third World democracies. However, the first component of this strategy has historically led the United States into costly Third World conflicts that this research shows has had few positive effects, and often has been harmful. This paper also examines this strategy in terms of vital interest. Regional assessments of Africa, Asia, and Latin America revealed no vital interest for the United States to conduct insurgency or counterinsurgency missions under the guise of Nation Assistance in any of these regions. As a result, this paper recommends this component of Nation Assistance be eliminated from the NMS and replaced with economic related assistance that will better serve our goal of promoting democracy.*

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A326 920

diGenova, J. E. "Terrorism, Intelligence, and the Law." In 'Proceedings of the Annual Symposium on the Role of Behavioral Science in Physical Security (9th) - Symmetry and Asymmetry of Global Adversary Behavior Held at Springfield, Virginia on 3-4 April 1984,' p. 53-59.

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 4 April 1984. 7p.

Abstract: *Terrorism is defined as the threat and use of psychological and physical force-including intimidation, coercion, repression, and ultimately, destruction of human lives and property-for the purpose of attaining real or imaginary ideological and political goals. In other words, terrorism should be regarded as an expedient tactical and strategic tool utilized by both established regimes and opposition groups functioning under varying degrees of stress. Obviously the first line of defense is the law enforcement agencies, and they're doing a good job. However, the problem of terrorism is so critical that it cannot be left to the law enforcement agencies alone. Much technology is available, and new technology usually can be developed to deal with most terrorists threats. The problem lies in making the decision to use specific technological countermeasures. Also, intelligence countermeasures are possible but are not used because of public attitudes and political and bureaucratic restrictions. In other words, our democracy is restrained by moral and legal principles in countering terrorism. To correct this weakness we must mobilize both the public and Congress to help strengthen the prediction, prevention, contingency planning, and crisis management capabilities of the U.S. government.*

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A152 459

"Foreign Intelligence Threat Awareness Programs: A Review." Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, February 1998. 228p.

Abstract: *In April 1996, the National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NACIPB) tasked the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) to review the effectiveness of foreign intelligence threat awareness (FITA) programs in the Executive Branch and among government contractors. The National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), as Executive Secretariat of the National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NACIPB), was appointed as project manager. Work on the review began in August 1996, and the study plan, prepared by PERSEREC, was approved by the NACIPB in September 1996. The objectives of the review were to (a) describe FITA*

activities in the Executive Branch and evaluate their effectiveness; (b) determine briefers' (referred to in this study as providers) perceptions of their capacity to effectively prepare and present briefings, and their views on organizational factors that may inhibit their ability to deliver effective briefings; (c) provide policymakers with information to help enrich programs by highlighting examples of excellent FITA materials; and (d) recommend improvements in the FITA system throughout government and industry.

REPORT NUMBER: PERS-TR-98-001

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A343 775

Gill, Thomas C. "Essays on Strategy VIII." Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1991. 162p.

Abstract: *ESSAYS ON STRATEGY VIII Begins with a study addressing the need for a shift in emphasis within the US intelligence community away from purely defense-related matters toward increasingly more important issues of international economics and commerce. If changes in the world continue at the current pace and extent, they could require such an unprecedented reorientation in national strategy. The other essays in this anthology also examine aspects of the changing international environment. Three of them -each of which was recognized for excellence in the Strategy Essay Competition sponsored by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - analyze the requirements of US policy toward post-Noriega Panama, options for relocating US military facilities displaced or soon to be displaced from the Philippines, and whether, if adopted, the resurrected Open Skies proposal would benefit the United States. The final essay, an especially thoughtful and wide-ranging one, explores the relationship of national public policy to differing cultural concepts of the nature of man.*

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A264 357

Grisham, Austin E., Jr. "Intelligence Support to Arms Control." Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 09 April 1990. 46p.

Abstract: *This paper argues that intelligence support is critical to the success of arms control. It identifies and describes the roles of intelligence in the arms control process, describes the existing intelligence organizational structure for arms control support, and identifies and analyzes issues. The roles include support to policy formulation, support to treaty negotiation, support to ratification, and finally, during verification, support for the implementation of the treaty through monitoring. The Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for monitoring, while the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has responsibility for verification. Adjudication of conflicting interpretations occurs within the NSC committee structure. For several reasons, intelligence cannot be expected to do the actual verification of an arms control treaty. Most importantly, determination of an acceptable degree of confidence is always a political issue, although based on military judgement. Assigning intelligence responsibility for monitoring, rather than verification, helps to limit the politicization of intelligence. Issues identified during the research for this paper were analyzed within three subgroups: those inherent in the intelligence discipline; these must be managed successfully to limit adverse impact on intelligence products. Second, issues and challenges inherent in arms control bureaucratic relationships; these are best managed by keeping separate the actual monitoring analysis and verification this gives the West justification for caution, and reinforces the need for continued emphasis on verification.*

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A222 911

Jones, Garrett, and Douglas H. Dearth. "Intelligence Support to United Nations Activities." Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 15 April 1993. 37p.

Abstract: *With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has been reinvigorated as a forum for the maintenance of world peace. The trend at present is clearly toward a more proactive stance,*

with the United Nations becoming involved in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking efforts. With this proactive stance has come an increasing need for intelligence support to United Nations activities. This study examines some of the problems associated with such an effort and possible structures and processes which can be implemented by both the United Nations and the United States. The key conclusions drawn by the study are that an intelligence structure within the United Nations needs to be established, with an emphasis toward making the process available to all members of the United Nations, while permitting individual countries to limit their involvement and protect their own unilateral interests. Within the United States government, a central structure needs to be established under the DCI to properly support United Nations activities as a U.S. policy tool, while effectively protecting U.S. intelligence community equities.

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A263 869

Levinson, Robert M. "The Utility of Quantitative Methods for Political Intelligence Analysis: A Case Study in Latin America." Master's thesis. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, 20 October 1995. 110p.

Abstract: The paper examines the suitability of current intelligence analysis developed during the Cold War era and finds a lack of quantitative techniques that are prevalent in academic social science research. Several areas where quantitative research might be applied successfully to intelligence analysis are proposed. A case study examining political instability in Latin America is utilized to demonstrate how these techniques might be applied. Data is taken from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators for nineteen Latin American countries. Two simple models are developed using bivariate and multiple regression techniques applied to time series analysis. A scenario for how these models might be applied in the intelligence collection, analysis, and policy formation process is postulated. The paper concludes that quantitative methods can have significant utility for the intelligence community in concert with current analytical methods. Suggestions are provided as to how these techniques might be incorporated into the intelligence community.

REPORT NUMBER: TR-95-128

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A300 517

Lewis, Ellen K. "A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence", by Walter Laquer - An Analysis." Student report. Maxwell, AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1988. 32p.

Abstract: An analysis of Walter Laqueur's book A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence concludes that it is useful professional reading for Air Force intelligence specialists. A synopsis of Laqueur's book and comparison of his conclusions with other contemporary focuses on three issues: the impact of intelligence on policy, the causes of intelligence failures, and the prospects for improvement of intelligence analysis.

REPORT NUMBER: ACSC-88-1580

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A195 602

Stille, Mark E. The Influence of British Operational Intelligence on the War at Sea in the Mediterranean June 1940 - November 1942." Newport, RI: Naval War College, Department of Operations, 08 February 1994. 43p.

Abstract: Intelligence derived from a number of sources, primarily the decryption of high-level German and Italian communications, provided British forces in the Mediterranean with extraordinary insights into Axis naval operations. This level of intelligence was instrumental to the success of British forces during most of the decisive points during the naval war in the Mediterranean and indirectly had great influence on the ground war in North Africa. Many of the hallmarks of the nature in which operational intelligence was used retains relevance for today's operational commander. These include use of intelligence to identify and attack enemy centers of

gravity, the importance of incorporating intelligence into the planning process, use of intelligence as a force multiplier but not as a force substitute, and the dissemination and handling of sensitive intelligence.

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A279 583

Stilwell, Richard G. "Keeping the Nation's Secrets: A Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Commission to Review DoD Security Policies and Practices." Washington, DC: DOD Security Review Commission, 19 November 1985. 121p.

Abstract: *The report contains an introduction, executive summary, overview and a three part report with sixty-three recommendations for change in DoD security policies and procedures related to the protection of classified material. Policy and Procedures, the first section of the report's main body, includes classified information access (clearances, investigations, adjudication, cryptographic controls, personnel supervisory evaluations and personnel information collection), managing and controlling classified information (classification, dissemination, transmission, retention and storage, special access program and international transfer agreements), and detecting and countering hostile intelligence, security awareness, reporting of possible espionage, and detecting and investigating security violators). Management and execution, the second part of the report, includes command emphasis, organizational arrangements, research, training, career development and program oversight. Resource management is the third and final section of the report.*

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A161 998

Swaine, Michael D. "The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security of Policymaking." Research report. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1996. 105p.

Abstract: *This report identifies and defines the leadership, structures, and processes governing Chinese military involvement in China's national security policy process. It emphasizes the specific mechanisms, both personal and bureaucratic, formal and informal, by which the Chinese military currently participates in national security policymaking, as well as the likely views and interests that the military seeks to advance in the national security arena.*

REPORT NUMBER: RAND/MR-782-OSD

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A314 066

Swicker, Eileen G. "Strategic Restructuring of the U.S. Intelligence Community: A Civilian Intelligence Reserve." Research project. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 15 March 1998. 43p.

Abstract: *The end of the Cold War led to significant reductions in national security spending and corresponding reductions in the Intelligence Community's (IC) workforce. The IC faces an increasing range of issues of interest to policy makers and remains responsible for covering both traditionally hostile states and new, transnational issues. The new challenges require skills not needed during the Cold War, and the current IC workforce lacks the specialized knowledge to fully cover the emerging transnational and global issues. Continuing budget restrictions prevent the IC from recruiting necessary specialists as full-time staff officers. This study argues that by developing a multi tiered Civilian Intelligence Reserve, the IC can gain access to collection and analytical expertise not found in the IC now.*

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A342 156

Tritten, James J. "Non-Traditional Forms of Intelligence." Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Department of National Security Affairs, 30 August 1993. 102p.

Abstract: *Report considers the new requirements for non-traditional forms of intelligence. Emphasis on new scenarios which require specialists in new forms of intelligence and areas of*

expertise. Due to the pace of rapid change and wide spectrum of threats, traditional attempts to determine intentions may not work. Authors recommend prioritized review of potential enemy capabilities with emphasis on potential military capability (population, geography, economics, technology for military potential capability), and more emphasis on long-range intelligence using deductive vice inductive approach. Report addresses current intelligence emphasis on technology and proliferation, and recommends identifying countries bent on acquiring new capabilities, what countries have the surplus capital to make such investments, and what levels they can internalize and absorb. Paralleling any effort to identify potential customers must be an economic intelligence program to delineate what is readily available on the open marketplace. Authors also conclude that there are no simple or quick fixes and that reorganization of the intelligence community is not the answer, but may be part of it. They strongly endorse more emphasis on human intelligence as a panacea. Report concludes that the real issue is strategic planning for intelligence, not intelligence in support of strategic planning. The intelligence community has the opportunity to assist the policy world in shaping the future and needs a plan to do this.

REPORT NUMBER: NPS-NS-93-003

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A273 430

Tritten, James J. and Paul N. Stockton. "Reconstituting National Defense: The New U.S. National Security Strategy." Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 30 September 1991. 198p.

Abstract: Explanation of President Bush's new national security strategy and General Colin Powell's Base Force. Sources of strategy. Analysis of major unresolved issues, such as: unilateral U.S. capability for war at strategic, operational, and tactical levels; impact on DoD organizations and joint military operations, the industrial and manpower base. Chapter on changing requirements for the U.S. intelligence community. Chapter on impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Analysis of role in Congress in formulating the strategy and their response to date. Implications for maritime and nuclear forces. Regional assessment from perspective of Asia and Europe. Study concludes that the major stress points of new strategy are: industrial reconstitution, additional requirements for intelligence, and the role that will be played by allies and the Congress. Includes impact of August 1991 coup in Soviet Union and unilateral announced by President Bush at end of September 1991.

REPORT NUMBER: NPS-NS-91-012

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A243 832

U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. "Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons." Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 1982. 58p.

Abstract: None available.

REPORT NUMBER: DOD-5240.1-R

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A267 680

Williams, Charles A. "Intelligence Support to U.N. Peacekeeping Operations." Washington, DC: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, April 1993. 30p.

Abstract: The United Nations' ability to resolve conflict will determine, to a large extent, the stability of emerging world order. Effective intelligence support greatly enhances peacekeeping and peacemaking, the operational aspects of conflict resolution. Providing effective and timely intelligence support to the United Nations' conflict resolution mission is in the U.S. national interest. The United States is dependent on international trade for both raw materials and markets for our products. Regional tension or conflict can disrupt world trade impacting our economy and potentially threatening our national security. The United States clearly benefits from the peaceful

resolution of disputes: successful conflict resolution efforts serve our national interests. The United States is the most powerful country, but it has neither the desire nor resources to impose and enforce a 'Pax American.' A less costly and risky alternative is supporting the United Nations which is assuming an increasing role in conflict resolution since the end of the cold war. With the best intelligence capability in the world it's logical for the U.S. to provide intelligence as our U.N. contribution; however, several issues require analysis and policy decisions: What can intelligence support do for peacekeeping efforts? Is intelligence support the most effective type? How should we share our intelligence? How do we protect intelligence sources? Should the U.S. share sensitive intelligence? These questions serve as the framework for this paper.

REPORT NUMBER: NDU/ICAF-93-S81

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A277 016

Woosley, Thomas E. "Intelligence Support for Counterproliferation." Research Report. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1996. 40p.

Abstract: *The success of the Clinton Administration's policy of Counterproliferation will likely depend on the ability of the Intelligence Community to deliver actionable intelligence to a wide range of consumers. This study explores fundamental, non-technical challenges and discusses implications of U.S. intelligence capabilities and limitations. It relies on an examination of recent pronouncements by policymakers, assessments of key Intelligence Community leaders and traditional sources.*

ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A309 481

Web Sites

United States Intelligence Community - Official Sites

CIA - Central Intelligence Agency

<http://www.odci.gov/cia/ciahome.html>

CIA - Center for the Study of Intelligence

<http://www.odci.gov/csi>

National Counterintelligence Center

<http://www.nacic.gov/>

Presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/pfiab/>

National Security Agency

<http://www.nsa.gov:8080/>

National Imagery & Mapping Agency

<http://www.nima.mil/>

National Reconnaissance Office

<http://www.nro.odci.gov>

Defense Intelligence Agency

<http://140.47.5.4/>

Air Force Intelligence Agency

<http://www.aia.af.mil/>

Department of State -- Bureau of Intelligence and Research

<http://www.state.gov/>

Department of the Treasury -- Office of Intelligence Support

<http://www.ustreas.gov/>

Federal Bureau of Investigation

<http://www.fbi.gov/mainIE.htm>

FBI Awareness of National Security Issues and Response Program

<http://www.fbi.gov/programs/ansir/ansir.htm>

International Intelligence Community - Official Sites

Australia Defence Signals Directorate
<http://www.dsd.gov.au/about.html>

Canada Security Intelligence Service
<http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/>

Canada IT Security
http://www.cse.dnd.ca/cse/english/home_1.html

UK MI-5
<http://www.mi5.gov.uk/>

UK Special Operations Executive in Western Europe
<http://www.pro.gov.uk/releases/soe-europe.htm>

UK Government Communications Headquarters
<http://www.gchq.gov.uk/>

UK Communications-Electronics Security Group
<http://www.cesg.gov.uk/about/>

Good Links

FAS (Federation of American Scientists) Intelligence Resource Program
<http://www.fas.org/irp/index.html>

National Security Institute Resource Net
<http://nsi.org/>

American Intelligence Study Group
<http://www.amintel.com/>

George Washington University National Security Archive
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/>

Literature of Intelligence Bibliography Searchable Database (Ransom Clark)
<http://intellit.muskingum.edu/intellsite/index.html>

CIABase Searchable Database
<http://webcom.com/%7Epinknoiz/covert/ciabasesearch.html>

CIA Speeches, Testimony and Other Products (FAS)
<http://sun00781.dn.net/irp/cia/product/>

Loyola Homepage on Strategic Intelligence
<http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel.html>

Military Intelligence Sites - unofficial (Loyola University).
<http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/milintel.html>

Columbia University Libraries US Government Documents: The US Intelligence Community
<http://www.columbia.edu/cu/libraries/indiv/dsc/intell.html>

US Intelligence and Security Agencies (by the Federal of American Scientists)
<http://www.fas.org/irp/official.html>

Z-Gram US Defense and Law Enforcement Communities
<http://www.zgram.net/>

Kim-Spy Intelligence and Counterintelligence
<http://mprofaca.cro.net/kimirror.html>

HUMINT (FAS)
<http://www.fas.org/irp/wwwspy.html>

SIGINT (FAS)
<http://www.fas.org/irp/wwwsignin.html>

IMINT (FAS)
<http://www.fas.org/irp/wwwimint.html>

MASINT (FAS)
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/masint_evaluation_rep.htm

MASINT (IC-21)
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_rpt/ic21/ic21007.htm

Intro to MASINT (NMIA)
<http://www.nmia.org/masint.htm>

OSINT (FAS)
<http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/oss980501.htm>

Info War.com (Winn Schwartau)
<http://www.infowar.com/>

Cryptome
<http://jya.com/crypto.htm>

Center for International Policy
<http://www.us.net/cip/cia.htm>

Ambassador David Fischer's Intelligence and Intelligence Agencies Syllabus
<http://bss.sfsu.edu/fischer/IR%20360/Default.htm>

Good Links – Business and Professional

Open Source Solutions

<http://www.oss.net/>

Aurora WDC Competitive Intelligence

<http://www.AuroraWDC.com>

Lookout Point Global Business Intelligence Systems

<http://www.lookoutpoint.com/index.html>

Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals

<http://www.scip.org/>

Stratfor.com

<http://www.stratfor.com/>

Intelligence Online Newsletter Reprints

<http://www.blythe.org/Intelligence/>

Intelligence Online

<http://www.indigo-net.com/intel.html>

Intelligence Professional

<http://www.thepalmerpress.com/welcome.html>

The Dragon's Breath (Operational Security Publication)

<http://pathfinder.com/@@y7yrfauarijhm2qe/fortune.1997/970217/boo.html>

Economic Intelligence and Commercial Intelligence on the Web

<http://www.fas.org/irp/wwwecon.html>

Association of Former Intelligence Officers

<http://www.afio.com>

National Military Intelligence Association

<http://www.nmia.org>

Association of Old Crows

<http://www.aochq.org/>

OPSEC Professionals Society

<http://www.opsec.org/>

Air America Association

<http://www.air-america.org>

Cloak and Dagger Books

<http://www.cloakanddagger.com/dagger>

International Intelligence History Study Group
<http://intelligence-history.wiso.uni-erlangen.de/>

Naval Intelligence Professionals
<http://www.xmission.com:80/~nip/>

Cloaks and Daggers Mailing List
<http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/kies/kia4th.htm>

Intelligence Forum
<http://www.intelforum.org/>

Professional Connections in the Intelligence Community
<http://www.pcic.net/>

Intelligence Careers
<http://www.intelligencecareers.com/>

Intelligence Students Association
<http://www.intelstudents.org/>

CIA Employment
<http://www.odci.gov/cia/employment/appframe.htm>

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<http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/intel/ic21/index.html>

Open Source Intelligence: Professional Handbook 1.0 [Proceedings, Volume I: Fifth International Symposium on "Global Security & Global Competitiveness: Open Source Solutions" -- Sheraton Premiere at Tysons Corner, Washington D.C. 15-18 September 1996]
<http://www.oss.net/HANDBOOK/>

Open Source Intelligence: Selected Readings 1992-1995 [Proceedings, Volume I: Fourth International Symposium on "Global Security & Global Competitiveness: Open Source Solutions"]
<http://www.oss.net/READER/>

Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence.
http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/dpos/epubs/int/report.html

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