

# Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations

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The most recent wave of democratization has placed control over military and security forces in the hands of elected officials in more countries than ever before. Despite the implications of this trend for international security, scholarly work on democratization and civil-military relations has tended to focus on purely local actors, interests, and strategies when explaining outcomes. When the impact of global trends is considered at all, the focus has been on imitation effects or structural changes in the international system. This is at odds with the reality that the international community has deliberately created a large number of programmes and institutions to promote democratization. This article argues that global democracy promotion efforts by leading powers, such as the United States and members of the European Union, have propagated a particular liberal understanding of civil-military relations which, in most parts of the world, has clearly privileged civilian control over two other elements of democratic civil-military relations, defence efficiency and military effectiveness. However, in the face of emerging transnational threats, new and old democracies have begun to focus once again on the dimensions of effectiveness and efficiency in their security sectors.

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Key words: civil-military relations; defence efficiency; military effectiveness

## Introduction

It has become common to think of democratization as a global phenomenon. The designation 'third wave of democracy' makes it clear that observers believe the group of democracies that emerged in the wake of Portugal's transition in 1974 had an impact on one another, at least in terms of timing and proximity. The puzzle is that most of the literature on democratic transitions views the phenomenon of democratic transitions as inextricably linked to local circumstances, political leaders, and strategic decisions.<sup>1</sup> To the extent that theorists have identified global linkages to explain the latest wave of democratization, explanations attribute it to either imitation effects on a regional level or a shift in the global *zeitgeist* that favours democracy.<sup>2</sup> This theoretical perspective appears to be at odds with the reality of myriad major efforts by the United States, European countries, and international organizations to promote democratization through political and economic incentives such as foreign aid, accession to regional treaty organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU), and most recently, a new

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'Wilsonianism' in US foreign policy that associates at least minimal democratization with the maintenance of state sovereignty and legitimacy.<sup>3</sup> Democratization as a global trend with an impact on security issues has only been seriously explored by the proponents of 'democratic peace theory', who argue that insofar as democracies do not fight each other, waves of democratization tend to reduce the likelihood of international conflict.<sup>4</sup> Critics such as Jack Snyder counter by pointing out that emerging democracies are conflict-prone, while others point to emerging but poorly understood transnational threats that target democratic societies.<sup>5</sup>

The third wave of democratization has been accompanied by an unprecedented shift in civil-military relations that has placed more power and instruments of control in the hands of elected leaders than at any other time in history. Pure military dictatorships have become exceedingly rare, as are military *coups d'état*. Such is the global compulsion towards maintaining at least the appearance of democracy that the traditional military dictatorship has been replaced by the emergence of qualified semi-democracies with civilian leaders clearly in charge despite their reliance on armed force to rule.<sup>6</sup> Tellingly, scholars of democratic civil-military relations have rarely, and not even systematically, examined the impact of democratization as a global trend on civil-military relations. Even more than democratization, civil-military relations has been treated as a product of domestic political interaction on which international forces have little influence. Practically the only argument of any currency that takes seriously the impact of global forces is that which points to the nefarious influence of US military training, particularly in Latin America; as this article will point out, however, significant US and other international assistance actually has focused on improving civilian control of the military since the 1980s.<sup>7</sup> Examination of the role of international democracy promotion in reforming police and para-military forces is even less common than that which focuses on civil-military relations.<sup>8</sup>

Once we take democratization seriously as a global phenomenon with an impact on civil-military relations, we are led to explore an important set of new phenomena. First, the empowering of civilian political leaders, who often have little or no background on security issues and may be suspicious of the armed forces, is likely to alter the ways states approach security issues. In particular, this change in authority and control over budgets and resources produces shifts in national defence strategies, military capabilities, and defence spending, with their consequent impact on neighbouring states' threat perceptions.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, to the extent democracies are indeed unlikely to fight each other, as seems the case among the members of well-established security communities such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in the European Union (EU), and the economic community that is the Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), democratization is likely to foster a search for new roles and missions for the armed forces. For example, the emergence of South America as a major source of peacekeeping forces gives additional international status and credibility to Mercosur partners and associates Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile. Most importantly, the US and Europe have launched and sustained a major effort to export their characteristically liberal understanding of civil-military relations to new democracies around the world. Although largely uncoordinated, the emphasis on civilian control is remarkably consistent, but it has not previously been systematically studied.

The impact of global democratization trends on civil-military relations is examined by focusing on the linkages that have allowed the US and Europe to transmit their civil-military doctrine and practices to emerging democracies. Democracy promotion by these leading powers has structured the globalization of a particular 'liberal' understanding of civil-military relations which, in most parts of the world, has clearly privileged civilian control over the other two elements of democratic civil-military relations: defence efficiency and military effectiveness.<sup>10</sup> Interestingly, the almost exclusive focus on civilian control is tempered in very particular circumstances by the traditional security requirements produced by either the international environment, such as the Cold War, or by alliance structures such as NATO and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The privileging of civilian control in other parts of the world has led many countries to place too little emphasis on developing effective and efficient defence establishments. Paradoxically, leading powers have also provided military assistance in the fights against terrorism and illegal drugs, prevention of human rights abuses, and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, while at the same time neglecting to focus on promoting effectiveness and efficiency. In our conclusion, we suggest that we may begin to see a shift in emphasis within new democracies towards defence efficiency and effectiveness, yet the shift is likely to be uneven and chaotic in many states, particularly the vast majority that lack explicit national security strategies or defence planning processes.

This article is not intended to provide a definitive answer regarding the relationship between international democratization trends and civil-military relations. Rather, it focuses on explaining the impact of a particular liberal understanding of civil-military relations on emerging democracies in the past 25 years. The article first examines the origins of democracy promotion programmes by the US and Europe from the beginning of the 'third wave', and their impact on civil-military relations in emerging democracies. It analyses the circumstances under which global democracy promotion has tended to focus almost exclusively on issues of civilian control. The account then turns to examining the potential impact of democracy promotion on defence efficiency and military effectiveness in new democracies. The article concludes with some conjectures on how emerging transnational threats are affecting the current configuration of civil-military relations in new democracies, and how this may be forcing a shift towards greater attention to the output, in terms of security, of the defence sector in these countries.

### **Democracy Promotion and the Spread of Civilian Control of the Armed Forces**

In the contemporary era, after the imposition of democracy by the democratic victors of World War Two in Germany, Italy, and Japan, and more recently on a small scale in Grenada and Panama, the beginning of explicit democracy-building programmes is synonymous with the advent of the so-called 'third wave' of democratization. Samuel Huntington has suggested the 'third wave' began on 25 April 1974 with the military coup in Portugal that became a revolution, and ultimately opened the way to democratization, not only in Portugal but also in Spain, Greece, and then in South America.<sup>11</sup>

While the rhetoric of US foreign policy may long have enshrined the promotion of democracy as a mission, the US did not begin to think seriously about what tools it needed to carry out such a mission until it began to react to democratization in southern Europe. The democracy promotion model established at the beginning of the 'third wave' in revolutionary Portugal in the mid- and late-1970s is essentially the same as is followed today, but with unprecedented growth and institutionalization of the actors, instruments, and resources involved. This model is far more complex than what is proposed by analyses in the scholarly literature on international determinants of democratization which, in our view, are too general.<sup>12</sup> By focusing on democratic *zeitgeists* or contagion effects, these theories overlook the specific diplomatic instruments and bargaining strategies employed by states and international institutions to foster particular kinds of democracy. Aside from the reports of those directly involved, we can only imagine what kinds of promises and threats are made along the way, including military diplomacy, utilizing *demarches*, 'non-papers', cajoling, and other informal instruments of power. Similarly, arguments about democratic contagion effects are generally structural, and they do not account for the strategic behaviour of a wide variety of external actors in transition processes, which seems strange because democratization theory does a good job of explaining the impact of this type of activity by domestic actors.<sup>13</sup> What is lacking in the contagion analysis is a description of the explicit mechanisms that promote democratic civil-military relations. We are unlikely to acquire detailed knowledge of the diplomatic strategies major powers use in specific instances, but we can begin to get a sense of the general approach by focusing on their democracy promotion programmes and the resources they commit to them.<sup>14</sup>

### **The Origins of Contemporary Democracy Promotion: The Portuguese Revolution 1974**

The 1974 Portuguese revolution galvanized the international promotion of democracy and set the current pattern for external actors to support 'third wave' democracies. It must be stated up front and forcefully, however, that the coup of 25 April 1974 that began the revolution took place with *no* foreign involvement, and, for that matter, no foreign awareness. Once begun, the archaic political structure of the Salazar dictatorship, based fundamentally on repression, collapsed and opened the way for a political radicalization that was stoked by the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and other rapidly forming parties and movements to its left. The Soviet Union and its surrogates quickly became deeply involved, Portugal underwent revolutionary changes, its colonies were given independence, and Portuguese foreign policy shifted far to the left. In that era, when Richard Nixon was president of the US and Henry Kissinger secretary of state or national security advisor, Washington was extremely concerned by radical changes in a NATO ally that provided important military bases for defence against the Soviet Union, as well as out-of-area operations such as during the October 1973 Arab–Israeli war.<sup>15</sup> Initially, the US was unwilling to accept a major political upheaval in Portugal, even though the changes taking place had already escaped beyond its control. This virtual paralysis in US policy (that in retrospect was better than some of

the possible alternatives, such as supporting an intervention from Spain) opened the way for European political involvement, thereby initiating a pattern that has been frequently repeated since 1974.<sup>16</sup>

The Europeans, chiefly the Germans and Norwegians, through their leadership of the Socialist International, moved into the vacuum to encourage a democratic direction for Portugal.<sup>17</sup> This required countering the efforts of both the PCP and radical officers in one sector of the Armed Forces Movement. They did this initially by providing resources to strengthen the nascent democratic forces in Portugal, which were very weak and extremely fragmented. The instruments they utilized were basically the *Stiftungen* (foundations) of the three major German political parties, the Konrad Adenauer, Friedrich Ebert, and Friedrich Neumann foundations, and the national (in Germany and Belgium) as well as international offices of the labour unions. These groups encouraged Portuguese would-be or proto-democratic politicians, union leaders, journalists, and agricultural cooperative leaders to build democratic institutions, by helping to educate and train them, fund democracy-building efforts and provide them with the technical means (printing presses, telephones, and the like) to do their political work.<sup>18</sup>

The European powers were extremely active in the Portuguese democratic transition, and the success they achieved became obvious to the world very quickly. Meanwhile, once Washington became convinced that Portugal was not 'lost to communism' – a change of heart brought about by the excellent team that Ambassador to Lisbon Frank Carlucci assembled to work on the issues – the US found that it lacked the instruments to assist Portuguese democratic forces in anything like the same manner as the Europeans. What the US had was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was not looked upon very positively by the Nixon and Ford administrations since it had failed to predict the coup of 25 April, and the agency was just beginning to face scrutiny by the Church and Pike committees in the US Senate and House of Representatives respectively. The alternative, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), was at the time barred from providing funds for political programmes. The US labour movement did become involved in Portugal, but not effectively since its methods of operation, not to mention ideological orientation, were very different from its European counterparts and had little traction in the radicalized political environment of the Portuguese revolution.<sup>19</sup>

As the Europeans helped put content into the basic and preliminary institutions of Portuguese democracy, the US and other major economic powers would begin to shape the overall development of Portugal. That is, they provided economic support through the US Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund and the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, to ensure that Portugal would develop as a pluralist democracy and not a communist dictatorship. As Portugal was the first transition of the third wave, democratic contagion effects were not relevant. Indeed, the contagion effect would have been more likely to push for a return to fascist dictatorship given the concern the US and Spain had regarding the radicalization of the Portuguese Revolution.<sup>20</sup>

The above analysis is more or less generally accepted among scholars, although there is little literature explicitly describing developments in Portugal. What is less

well understood is the military dimension of Portuguese democratization, and that it had an important influence on the development of current international programmes promoting democratic civil-military relations. Portugal's preceding authoritarian regime, which was controlled by civilians, had been in place since 1930. A sector of the young officers who had led the coup in 1974 intended that the new regime would institutionalize a predominant role for the armed forces in government. It was not their intention to establish a democratic regime based on free and fair elections. The counterstrategy developed by the US, Germany, and NATO itself sought to wean the officers out of politics and into more purely professional activities, largely through their inclusion in NATO missions. Obviously there were certain individuals, namely General Ramalho Eanes, who was elected president in 1976 and again in 1980, and the leaders of the three democratic parties, who played a large role in preventing the establishment of a military regime. But what is most important is that the US, Germany, and others had the institutional framework of NATO within which to develop and implement their strategy. Furthermore, the NATO allies could provide powerful incentives to Portuguese officers through their ability to provide modern training and equipment.<sup>21</sup> In other words, the external actors had something of significant value to offer the Portuguese military to encourage it to get out of government and out of politics. This was the first time that these strategies, actors, and instruments were used to promote a democratic transition and later democratic consolidation.

What can be learned from the experience of Portugal at the beginning of the 'third wave'? First is the need for external actors to be flexible when supporting democratization. Nobody, not the Portuguese themselves (with the possible exception of the 200 young officers who were the instigators), the US, or NATO, was prepared for the coup that became a revolution. Once it began, the Europeans, especially the Germans, used their foundations and other organizations to influence developments and put Portugal on a democratic path. Second, the role of external security considerations in shaping defence reform appears to be significant. The military dimension of democratization in Portugal took place in the context of the Cold War, when base access and NATO unity were critically important for US and European national security. There were real international security reasons to integrate the Portuguese fully into NATO, to assist them in being effective and efficient participants in NATO missions, and at the same time to assist in the consolidation of Portuguese democracy. Third, once the value of foundations, labour organizations and the like were proven in Portugal, they were then repeatedly called on throughout the 'third wave' of democratization. The common dominator in these programmes is the promotion of political learning, whereby individuals and groups in the 'third wave' democracies can understand how their predecessors created and manage their democratic institutions.

### **Contemporary Democracy Promotion Programmes and Civil-Military Relations**

The historical evolution of the third wave from southern Europe to South America and Central America, East-Central Europe, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa was not directly

caused by specific programmes implemented by major powers, but rather by an interaction of domestic and international factors. Once a given transition began, however, whether for endogenous reasons or in reaction to an external shock, and certainly as countries seemed to be consolidating new regimes, democratizers could benefit from a myriad of programmes to support this consolidation. In a relatively early monograph, Larry Diamond surveyed the remarkable variety of actors and programmes engaged in democracy promotion.<sup>22</sup> Democracy promotion has become big business, and the US now has a wide array of programmes at its disposal. Following the lead of Germany and its foundations, Congress created the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 1984. NED supports, at least in part, a series of other organizations including the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), foundations associated with the two major US political parties. USAID, through its Office of Democracy and Governance, helps its field missions design and implement democracy strategies, provides technical and intellectual leadership in the field of democracy development, and manages some USAID programmes directly. In Fiscal Year 2006, the agency's basic Democracy and Governance programmes will cost about US\$37 million. The USAID Office of Transitional Initiatives also supports democratizers during the very initial stages of regime change. In terms of funding, the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, for example, had a 2005 budget of \$11 million, and the US International Military Education and Training (IMET) 2005 budget was just short of \$90 million. Private and international initiatives have also gained prominence. Billionaire George Soros established the Open Society Institute, one of the most famous of the private foundations that support one or another element of democracy; the United Nations Foundation, funded by American media tycoon Ted Turner, has also become engaged in this field. Other prominent actors include the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the EU, and the Organization of American States. These programmes deal to a large extent with the basic elements of democracy such as the media, non-governmental organizations, electoral systems, and political parties.<sup>23</sup>

It is nevertheless remarkable that, despite all the work to promote democratic civil-military relations, there has been virtually no systematic assessment of the roles external actors have played in shaping civil-military relations in the third wave. To highlight this, it is worth noting that the highly regarded Freedom House index, which rates freedom globally, does not include a variable dealing with security, defence, and the relations between military and civilians.<sup>24</sup> The few academic studies of democratic civil-military relations rarely include a reference to the impact of external assistance programmes. Felipe Aguero's 1995 monograph on civil-military relations during Spain's transition to democracy, for example, only briefly discusses the influence of NATO accession on the domestic interplay between military and civilian actors, despite the fact that accession to NATO and the EU caused major public debates before, during, and after Spain's democratic transition and, according to Aguero, assisted the transition.<sup>25</sup> There is, in short, no literature that deals with civil-military relations in which the effect of foreign programmes and relationships is systematically analysed. In part, this is because the literature on democratization has tended to emphasize the pre-eminence of domestic factors in explaining

the construction of new regimes, and secondarily, because few of the practitioners of democracy promotion in the area of civil-military relations write for academic audiences, often because they are employed by governments and militaries of the developed world that do not encourage such publications.

Coupled with the failure to assess the impact of external actors is an absence of any systematic survey of the programmes that promote democratic civil-military relations themselves. Jay Cope's short monograph on the IMET programme, and an even shorter survey by Hans Born of programmes that deal more or less with oversight in the security sector, are the only such published studies we know of.<sup>26</sup> It is shocking that even in the case of the US government there is not a comprehensive listing of the programmes that provide support for defence reform, civilian oversight of the security sector, and civil-military relations. This is despite the fact that they are funded, directly or indirectly, by the US government, and are thus obliged to follow its reporting and auditing requirements. There have been only two systematic attempts to survey the programmes funded by the US: a limited inventory conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in October 2002; and a more comprehensive survey mandated by and conducted for the powerful office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in 2003, the results of which have not been publicly released.

What became obvious from the NPS assessment of a large number of government programmes that support democratic civil-military relations through training or education, is that every component of the US military education and training endeavour includes some form of international outreach. There is a glaring problem with these diverse programmes, however, because they fail to make any explicit linkage with, or even demonstrate a clear concept of, how they support democratic civil-military relations, let alone democratic consolidation. In short, the programmes that support democratic civil-military relations are not integrated into the larger field of democracy-building.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, Hans Born finds that while there are many organizations supporting security sector reform and democratization processes:

Civil-military relations are apparently not a central issue of parliamentary assistance programmes. Mostly military different [sic] institutions, such as the NATO or national defence ministries, carry out the assistance programmes for promoting democratic civil-military relations but they are not so much regarded as being central to parliamentary assistance programmes.

He continues, 'it seems that assistance programmes for democratic civil-military relations and for parliaments are taking place but on different tracks, carried out by different aid providers'.<sup>28</sup> Clearly the fragmentation of democratic civil-military relations efforts pertains in both US and European programmes.

In the US, besides the much larger programmes supported by foreign military sales and financing, there are two main categories of programmes that are oriented specifically towards improving democratic civil-military relations. The first include those funded by the IMET programme; the second are the regional centres designed to promote democratic civil-military relations and security. The IMET programme was begun in 1976, and was revised in 1991 after the end of the Cold War. Explicit objectives of the IMET programmes include fostering civilian control of the military,

promoting human rights, and helping resolve civil-military conflicts. The 2006 IMET budget was slightly less than \$87 million, and supports a wide variety of democracy promotion organizations that are designed to provide education and training in the US and abroad.

The Department of Defense undertook its own initiative in this area beginning in 1992, and has created five regional centres that seek specifically to promote democratic civil-military relations (security assistance is included in the Department of State appropriation). The first, the George W. Marshall Center in Germany, was created in 1992, and its mission statement captures the overall sense of the other four: 'The mission of the Marshall Center is to create a more stable security environment by advancing democratic institutions and relationships, especially in the field of defence; promoting active, peaceful security cooperation; and enhancing enduring partnerships among the nations of North America, Europe and Eurasia.'<sup>29</sup> In addition to the Marshall Center, the Department of Defense has founded and generously funds the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (for Latin America), and the newest, founded in 2000, the Near East and South Asia Center. The budget for these regional centres easily rivals the total size of the IMET budget. Thus, with nearly US\$200 million per year committed to democratic civil-military relations promotion, the US government effort easily exceeds that of other countries that also have programmes, such as the Swiss Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, and smaller organizations in Canada and Britain.<sup>30</sup>

The content of the different IMET and regional centre programmes puts the emphasis overwhelmingly on civilian control. Defence efficiency (using limited resources rationally and with the least possible waste) comes in after that at a very distant second. They also give minimal attention to the promotion of effectiveness in the implementation of military roles and missions (getting the assigned job done with the resources and within the time allotted). The only programmes where effectiveness is included as a key element are those of NATO, the PfP, and in peacekeeping and counter-terrorism education and training. This highlights an important dichotomy among programmes that promote democratic civil-military relations: there are those that promote both military effectiveness and defence efficiency on an equal basis with civilian control, mostly for new NATO and PfP countries; and there are those that focus solely on civilian control. This is even stranger when we discover that the US Department of Defense guidance to combatant commanders on security assistance emphasizes all three elements of the defence trinity. It should be noted that in the non-democratic regimes of the original PfP members, civilians did control the armed forces; they just were not democratically elected civilians.<sup>31</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, the PfP, which serves as both a pathway into NATO and a way to engage countries that are not members of NATO, has reinforced and made very clear the importance of all aspects of the trinity of civil-military relations. Point 1 of the *Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building* states:

The Member states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council reaffirm their conviction that effective and efficient state defence institutions under civilian

and democratic control are fundamental to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and essential for international security cooperation. They agree to establish a Partnership Action Plan to support and sustain further development of such institutions across the Euro-Atlantic Area.<sup>32</sup>

In short, the PfP plan essentially commits the NATO allies to help the new democracies develop control, effectiveness, and efficiency, goals also promoted in the programmes sponsored by the NATO School at Supreme Headquarters in Belgium, the PfP Training and Education Centers, and the Military Assistance Programme. The fact that these elements are essentially prerequisites for NATO accession acts as a carrot and a stick for both civilian and military leaders in the new democracies, much as did the offer of NATO assistance to Spain and Portugal in the 1970s and 1980s.

By contrast, programmes to promote democratic civil-military relations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America focus almost exclusively on civilian control of the military. There is no overarching directive framework for the regions similar to NATO and PfP, but rather a fragmented menu of programmes. Most of the work sponsored by the four Department of Defense regional centres (excluding the Marshall Center), IMET institutions, the US National Endowment for Democracy, and the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces also deal only with the civilian-control element of the defence trinity. This is perhaps not surprising given that the previous non-democratic regimes in these three regions were dominated by the armed forces, and we therefore should not minimize the achievement that consolidating civilian control represents. The lack of attention to efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces, however, not only puts national security at risk, it also endangers what is likely a tenuous bond of trust between civilians, the new democratic regime and the armed forces.

### **Explaining Variation in Democratic Civil-Military Relations Promotion Programmes**

The split impact of democratization programmes on military effectiveness and defence efficiency is striking when we compare the cases of Central Europe with those in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. This section examines the interests of donor and recipient countries in improving each of these aspects of democratic civil-military relations.

In Central Europe, democratization produced governments that focused on all elements of democratic civil-military relations because they were eager to accede to the EU and NATO. It is true that these alliance structures had strict requirements for civilian control of the military, but they also expected aspirants to achieve significant military capabilities compatible with the overall alliance strategy. This provided democratizers with an incentive to take the dimensions of civil-military relations other than control seriously. It also helped democratic politicians justify continuing investment in the military at a time when the likelihood of interstate war in Europe was declining rapidly.

In the rest of the world, by contrast, politicians – and donor countries – had few incentives to maintain significant military capabilities, except in localized instances

where interstate conflict was a real possibility, or to achieve particular defence outcomes. For national politicians, promoting military effectiveness meant strengthening the very forces that could potentially overthrow them. It also meant committing a significant amount of resources, energy, and government attention to the problem of defence reform.<sup>33</sup> For the armed services, the possibility of reform under civilian rule opened the door to a frightening world in which none of their traditional missions would remain sacred. Given the perceived lack of an external threat, particularly in Latin America, there was the possibility of being reduced to a mere constabulary force.<sup>34</sup> Similarly, civilians did not necessarily have the time or the interest, except in some situations in Asia where the external threat was high, to formulate national strategies and policies. This led them to neglect the definition of clear roles and missions for their armed forces, or to relate the development of certain capabilities and effectiveness with particular national objectives.

The main concern of donor countries with interests in these parts of the world was to prevent local armed forces from abusing their own populations or overthrowing their own governments. Beyond that, donors had little interest in military effectiveness, at least until the 9/11 attacks on the US forced them to re-examine the need for capable regional military partners. Even then, international donors, to the extent that they promoted military effectiveness, were interested in niche capabilities such as counter-drug or peacekeeping operations, none of which justified maintenance of the kinds of conventional defence establishments that fit with the traditions and self-image of the military establishments of these regions.

Of these explanations for why military effectiveness receives such varied attention in new democracies, probably the most important factor is the motivation of civilian leaders, now that the armed forces are generally under control, to promote a capable military. At a minimum, better forces would cost more money, and there is no obvious electoral gain from pushing for an increased level of effectiveness. Even in the NATO and PfP regions, where there are incentives in the form of accession to regional alliance structures, it is difficult for elected politicians to sustain programmes and obtain the resources required for building effectiveness. Outside this region, achieving a capable military is rare, even in high threat situations. The case of Colombia, where there is a well-recognized threat, is illustrative. The Colombian military resists establishing the necessary reforms and institutions to build effectiveness because this would require significant structural reforms in their training, organization, and career paths and expose them to greater personal risk. In addition, Colombian civilian politicians do not want to commit the required political capital and energy, even though they are the recipients of massive US military aid to do just that.<sup>35</sup> In short, civilians and officers in most of the world's newer democracies have few incentives to focus on their deficiencies when it comes to achieving effectiveness in military roles and missions. This may be why these countries rarely formulate national security strategies. To the best of our knowledge, only Colombia, at the behest of Washington, which is financing much of the government's fight against insurgencies, and Chile, where it was part of the consolidation agenda, have well-developed national security strategies.

Outside the NATO/PfP region, politicians in aid-recipient countries actually have had more incentive to reduce than promote efficiency. One of the few scholars

to have taken the impact of democratization on military budgets seriously is Wendy Hunter, who demonstrates that politicians will naturally seek to reduce defence budgets in order to satisfy the demands of important constituents and stakeholders.<sup>36</sup> Some of the literature on the Argentine transition to democracy suggests that an important objective of Argentina's civilian governments after 1983 was to eliminate border disputes and foster democratization in neighbouring states, so as to undercut the rationale for a large military force.<sup>37</sup> Overall, the evidence seems to suggest that democratization as an international phenomenon has led politicians to focus on defence reduction as part of an overall drive to free resources to meet the demands of other constituencies, and not incidentally reduce the ability of the armed forces to threaten the security of new regimes.<sup>38</sup>

Defence efficiency, understood as the ability to field military capabilities sufficient to satisfy assigned roles and missions at the lowest cost, has been part of the international democratization agenda of donor countries only to a limited extent. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank appear to have goals congruent with those of politicians in donor countries, to the extent that they consider defence spending superfluous. Defence efficiency has been promoted by the major donor countries mostly as an aspect of effectiveness. Codified national security objectives, in the form either of Defence White Books (popular with European donors) or National Security Strategies (popular with the US defence establishment), are seen as a precursor to the rationalization of defence capabilities. Promoters of democratization in the US and Europe have pushed for transparency in defence spending as part of the overall drive to reduce interstate tensions, reduce corruption, and increase citizen access to defence data in new democracies.<sup>39</sup> Argentina and Chile are engaged in a sustained project to produce an accounting of their defence expenditures in a common format, with such goals in mind. Nevertheless, outside Europe and NATO, the purpose of defence efficiency at best is to rationalize budget reductions.

These findings re-emphasize the gap between those democratizing states that participate in international alliance structures and those that do not. New NATO and PFP countries consider defence efficiency to be important because it allows their governments to realign their defence capabilities to meet alliance standards more rapidly. It also helps establish the credibility of new NATO partners among those of longer standing. In less conflict-ridden regions of the world, however, any focus on defence efficiency is undermined by a failure to agree on what the roles and missions of the armed forces should be. The US maintains that the role of the military in Africa and Latin America essentially should be to carry out internal security functions associated with counter-drug operations and counter-terrorism, as well as some level of peacekeeping or peace-making. This limited inventory of roles and missions often does not square with what military leaders would prefer. The lack of clarity over what roles and missions should be, and how to implement changes, means that governments have no clear idea of what defence 'product' they are paying for. In the absence of concrete defence outputs, it is difficult to make a case for robust defence budgets in democratizing states.

## Conclusion

There are large gaps in the literature on the impact of international factors on democratic consolidation. To begin with, few scholars include external factors in their analyses of democratic consolidation. Those studies that do examine the impact of democracy promotion programmes focus on the basic components of democracy such as electoral systems, political parties, the media and the like, and exclude elements of national security and defence, including civil-military relations. There also is scant analysis of international programmes that support civil-military relations within the context of democratic consolidation. For that matter, there are barely any surveys on the spectrum and scope of these programmes. From our research, we find the overwhelming emphasis of these programmes is on democratic civilian control. The only region where this is not the case lies under the NATO and PfP umbrella, where there is an explicit framework for membership that emphasizes effectiveness. In the rest of the world, there is an almost total absence of attention to the institutional and other requirements for military effectiveness, and a very powerful set of disincentives for this circumstance to change.

There are, however, two current global trends that may encourage renewed attention to defence efficiency and effectiveness in the developing (non-NATO/PfP) world: peacekeeping and counter-terrorism. Peacekeeping has become a major industry since the end of the Cold War, with the number of both missions and personnel expanding substantially. Increasingly, these missions deviate from traditional peacekeeping into peace enforcement operations in hostile environments. The demands on the professionalism and skill of peacekeeping troops have grown, and the eagerness of countries to participate has increased as well. This can be explained in part by the attractiveness of UN reimbursements for peacekeeping troops, the enhanced international image garnered by those countries that are major peacekeeper providers, and the desirability of new professional roles for militaries in democratizing states. One of the side-effects is renewed attention to issues of effectiveness and efficiency as new peacekeeping providers interact with more established and professional armed forces in these types of operations, creating a demand within democratizing states for defence reform.

Counter-terrorism operations may also provide an impetus for better military effectiveness, particularly in those countries that have been the targets of terrorist attacks. Here, the momentum for defence reform may still be slowed by domestic arguments over the role of the armed forces in internal conflict, threats to civil liberties, and preference for police-led counter-terrorism activities. There is also the danger that international donor countries, particularly the US, may emphasize military effectiveness at the cost of promoting civilian control of the armed forces. The US and the EU are clearly at odds over whether military or police forces are the best instruments for counter-terrorism policies, and this divergence may be reflected in their programmes that target democratizing states. It is too soon to tell whether there will be significant future trade-offs in these areas.

Finally, there is one very old motivator that may still foster pockets of defence effectiveness and efficiency outside existing alliance structures or new missions

such as peacekeeping and counter-terrorism: the balance of power. There are parts of the world, particularly in East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, where traditional security concerns lead civilian and military leaders to share a preference for defence efficiency and military effectiveness. In these cases, however, democratization as a global trend has not necessarily been the prime motivator of defence reform.

## NOTES

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